Universal Rent Control via Collective Bargaining

Below is a copy of the copied over version of the original paper. The paper in it’s original and intended form can be found here.
A media statement summarising and explaining this paper can be found here.

Universal Rent Control via Collective Bargaining Renter’s And Housing Union’s Rent Control Position Paper

Authors & Contact

Authors

Dozens of members over many months helped shape and contributed to create Renters and Housing Union (RAHU)’s rent control paper, all are greatly thanked for such contributions.
Special thanks to the efforts of our largest contributors:

  • Samantha Floreani
  • Alex Gruenewald
  • William van den Wall Bake

Contact

If you have any questions, queries or want to discuss the positions outlined in the paper, please feel free to get in touch!

Renter’s and Housing Union – [email protected] 

Research and Policy Committee – [email protected] 

William van den Wall Bake (Research and Policy Officer) – [email protected]

Who we are 

RAHU is a member-run union. We are renters, public housing tenants, squatters, the homeless, home-owners, and people in unstable housing from all Australian states and territories. Collectively we organise for the right to affordable, accessible, and appropriate housing for all, through self-advocacy, education and eviction defence. 

Acknowledgement of Country

RAHU acknowledges that we live and work on the stolen and unceded lands of First Nations peoples across this continent. As the custodians of these lands we pay our respects to their elders, ancestors and warriors past, and present.

We recognise that First Nations peoples are first and foremost affected by displacement, dispossession, and housing insecurity, and as such RAHU commits to engaging with the continued struggle for decolonisation.

Commitment to Decolonisation

In brief

Australia faces a severe rental crisis, with soaring rents far outpacing wages and inflation, forcing renters to sacrifice essentials and increasing homelessness risk. While long-term solutions like public housing are needed, the Renters and Housing Union (RAHU) proposes immediate rent controls.  

We argue historical (like during COVID) and current (Canberra) examples, as well as international (Vienna and Sweden’s) success, prove rent control is effective and doesn’t reduce supply as critics claim. 

RAHU’s specific model of Rent Control is unique – no country in the world has adopted Rent Control via collectively bargained rents with such specific prescriptions applied to such agreements; But implementation of such a system is a must in the Australian context.

Recommendations 

RAHU proposes the following

  1. An immediate freeze to rent increases for 2 years
    • Allowing for wages to catch up with current rent increases.
    • After the 2 year period, rent rises would not be able to occur unless it is agreed to under a collectively bargained agreement between landlords and renters.
  2. Require every residential rental agreement be negotiated via collective bargaining
    • All rents would be set through negotiated agreements between organised groups of tenants and landlords.
  3. Minimum standards would be required for every agreement. These include:
    1. At least 80% of tenants in an agreement must pay ≤30% of after-tax income in rent (with a target: 95% at ≤25%).
    2. Tenants retain the irrevocable right to collectively withhold rent.
    3. A rent increase cap, whereby the percentage of increase on rent cannot exceed the rate of real wage growth of the tenants under an agreement.
  4. The creation of an open database of landlords and rentals. 
  5. An Independent Rent Authority (IRA) would be established to manage, facilitate, administer and enforce all of the outlined recommendations above.

Background

Australia faces a severe rental affordability crisis characterised by record-low vacancy rates, soaring rents, and a growing divide between owners and renters. Housing is an essential human right and the market is failing to provide that human right.

We know intervention is required by the government. In the long term, government-provided housing and other interventions are required to effectively and sustainably connect renters with existing and future housing stock.

However, in the short term the crisis continues. In light of that, and to prevent the spiraling crisis of homelessness, the RAHU elected to put together this paper to outline a Rent Control Policy that actually benefits renters and those disaffected by the housing market.

When setting out to write the RAHU Rent Control Position paper we set 3 basic requirements: 1) It must be a  policy the government implements – we did this as without this requirement listing what civil society and RAHU should do would greatly increase the scope of this position paper beyond what was acceptable. It also would’ve hurt the focus of the core thesis of this paper 2) The policy must be cheap in relative monetary/treasurery terms – as aforementioned, RAHU’s preferred policy is the mass building of public and co-op housing to make the rental market practically non-existent. The only scenario where a government would be considering rent control or similar policy in the long term is if they were fiscally limited. And finally 3) The policy must materially improve the conditions of renters – otherwise what’s the point?

History in Australia

Rent and eviction regulations have been implemented multiple times throughout the 20th century at both the state and federal levels in Australia. Notably, in 1939, national rent and eviction controls were introduced. These measures remained in effect in New South Wales and Victoria into the 1950s and 1960s.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Victoria implemented a rent freeze, providing significant relief for many tenants. Western Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania all adopted similar rent freeze measures, and all these states saw a flat lining, if not a decrease of rents when such controls were in place. 

However, since removing rent controls, rents went from the aforementioned stagnation and decrease, to seeing a massive increase. On average rents have increased by 40% since June 2021, far outpacing both economic growth and inflation. In the state of Western Australia Median rents have increased by an astounding 65%.

Case study: Comparing Canberran Rent Controls – There is only one jurisdiction in Australia where rent increases since June 2021 have matched inflation. Canberra has seen median rent increases of 16.67% vs an inflation rate since 2021 which has totalled 16%. This is although, since 2019, rent increases have been capped.        Canberra rentals are far more available than in comparable markets without rent control. Perth, for example, has a vacancy rate of 0.8%, despite having no rent controls, and despite vacancy rates being below 1% since 2021. Canberra, meanwhile, has seen vacancy rates hover between 1 and 2% since 2021 when their rent controls were implemented.         The two cities also had only 0.5% difference in Population Growth over the same period.        Suggesting that rent control doesn’t have as much effect on supply as many policy makers suggest. At least in the 6 years since the rent caps were implemented.

It is undeniable that rent control is effective and possible in Australia, and results in outcomes for the benefit of renters and Australians as a whole. 

The efficacy of rent controls can be seen not just in Australia, but also abroad.

International Examples

Case study: “Red Vienna” and Vienna Rent Controls – In 1920’s Austria, socialist control of Vienna allowed for implementation of rent controls. This saw large-scale affordability and led to a city where the vast majority of workers were paying less than 5% of income for rent (something currently unimaginable in any Australian city in 2025).
      The legacy of “Red Vienna” persists in modern day Vienna which has some of the most affordable housing and cheapest rents in Europe. This is the result of continually strong rent controls that apply to two thirds of Viennese housing stock.
        Arguments that rent control create disincentives to housing construction in the private market also do not add up. Over 2022 – 2023 Vienna, with a population of 1.9 million, saw 21,100 dwellings completed. Meanwhile, the entire state of Western Australia, with a population of 2.7 Million, saw only 14,967 dwellings commenced in the same period.
Case study: Swedish collectively bargained rental model – Since 1968, the overwhelming majority of rentals in Sweden have not been set by the landlord, but collectively bargained. In this system no one individual sets the rents, but instead a negotiation is done between the landlords and the tenants via their tenants union.         This leads to a far better system where one individual and their decisions cannot dominate and decide rents. It is estimated that if collectively bargained rents were removed in Sweden rents would increase rents by 30%-70%.         However, even with this model, lack of government investment and subsidies, combined with a general change in prevailing housing policy in Sweden in the 90’s, saw rents increase by 122% between 1986 and 2005.         The lack of minimum standards in these negotiations combined with the lack of government intervention in such negotiations, along with the removal of government subsidies in the market and the broader “financialisation” of the Swedish rental market is a primary cause of these high rent rises.

Problem statement 

Between 2021 and 2025, Australian rent prices increased nationally by almost 40%, while wages only rose by 11.1% over the same period. These rent increases are becoming increasingly challenging and difficult to manage, are placing growing amounts of the population in financial stress, while putting more and more people on the street.

Research conducted by Better Renting in 2024 found that renters are sacrificing necessities including food and healthcare in order to afford increasing rents. Nine in ten renters were paying more rent than they were just 12 months before, with 76% being a result of a notice of rent increase. 

This trend is creating more precarious situations for RAHU members and tenants overall. It not only strains tenants’ financial resources but also shifts greater power toward landlords. When housing affordability is so limited, landlords gain increased influence over tenants’ lives and may engage in questionable practices that tenants are often unable to contest out of concern about losing their rental accommodation.

Positions and options

Rent caps are required for the protection and dignity of renters within the private rental market. We believe that rents are already too high. Rent levels must both decrease and be held at acceptable levels that allow for affordable, appropriate and accessible housing for all. Our approach is grounded on the beliefs that rent control:

  • Is a short-term measure towards the long-term goal of public housing for all, but is still essential to protect renters in the private market from profit motives while it still exists.
  • Must prioritise the tenant(s) ability to pay the rent.
  • Must creates transparency of information between landlords and tenants,
  • Must reduce rents, not just cap them,
  • Must be connected to properties, not tenancy contracts,
  • Has strong accountability and enforcement mechanisms.
  • Must not set back or impede on the self organisation of tenants.
  • Must still allow tenants flexibility and the ability to choose where they live, and being able to pay above their means, if they so wish. 

In this proposal we will be also working with the following assumptions:

  • This policy is only about what policies the state (either federally or locally) can implement unilaterally.
  • Questions of legality or constitutionality of such proposals are beyond scope of this paper.
  • The proposal has a low cost (from a government spending perspective) when compared to more preferred options (such as mass building of public housing).

The ideal rent mechanism proposed by RAHU aims to both lower existing rents to acceptable levels and ensure that new rentals remain at affordable levels for tenants. 

Two-Year Freeze

Rents are too high and need to decrease to realise actual affordability for renters in Australia. Any proposed set rent limits on new tenancy agreements must lead to long term reductions in rent connected to that dwelling. 

In the immediate term, rents must be frozen for two years. The current growth and crisis is unsustainable. A freeze would allow for wage growth and government assistance to catch up to currently unaffordable rental rates. 

The two year time period will also allow for the setting up and development of the systems and administration required for collectively bargained rent control. These are outlined below.

Once the freeze is lifted a cap of rent increases equal to the % increases in the median wage in the past 6 months would exist until a collectively bargained rental agreement is in place.

Rent Control via Collective Bargaining

Establishing a system where rents are set through collective bargaining agreements between organised groups of tenants and landlords, similar to frameworks in modern employment systems, is the best way the government could assist renters via policy alone. 

This model empowers tenants to negotiate fair terms based on actual economic conditions, not speculative markets, and also avoids the great cost that a huge administrative state to enforce rent controls would require. It would be a requirement for all residential rental agreements in Australia to be negotiated via such bargaining. 

To ensure that the market remains equitable, and to also ensure no renter is left behind, every agreement would be required the following standards be followed:

  • At least 80% of tenants under any one agreement must pay no more than 30% of their after-tax income in rent, with a target of 95% paying 25% or less.
  • A rent increase cap, whereby the percentage of increase on rent cannot exceed the rate of real wage growth of the tenants under an agreement.
  • Tenants retain the right to collectively withhold rent as a measure of last resort, and such measures not be over-ridden by a previous agreement.

Such agreements would also be made on the property level, and once a property is attached to a certain agreement, it would be made difficult to move it off such an agreement without the tenants assent.

Structuring of negotiations.

RAHU can acknowledge that not every renter is renting from a landlord that is also renting to multiple other renters. Recognising that many landlords own only one or two properties, negotiations would be structured to consolidate multiple landlords and tenants into bargaining groups. These groups could be formed by a variety of factors (e.g: locality, property type, Real Estate Agency used e.t.c.) with a core principle being the tenants’ right to choose their representation to ensure a genuine balance of power.

It is critical that the renters are engaging in fair and free negotiations with landlords and that the coercion by landlords to force tenants to agree to poor agreements is avoided. 

Over the 2 year freeze period, it must be ensured renters are adequately organised and mobilised to be able to negotiate. It must be made certain that renters are participating in the negotiations from the roots. It cannot be allowed for a bureaucratic class to develop that becomes its own party to negotiations (union negotiated agreements often become 3 part negotiations where it is the Union vs the Workers vs the Employers – this must be avoided). Union-less negotiations for renters must be allowed. 

How the renters negotiate would not be universal. Some would have the renters in one room with landlords, maybe renters choose to elect a representative from their ranks. RAHU cannot possibly stipulate a “one size fits all” for how renters are represented in the negotiations. But the priority should be renters gaining power themselves, and that democratic structures of such negotiations are ensured.

It must also be ensured that “gerrymandering” of rental agreements doesn’t occur. Where arbitrary and unique collections of renters are drawn up as parties to allow exploitation of poorer renters as not being more than the 20% minimum. 

Enforcement of the rules, judgements on such agreements, and any other required controls as outlined above would be handled by The Independent Rent Authority.

The Independent Rent Authority (IRA)

A new administrative and mediating body would be established: the Independent Rent Authority (IRA). It would be expected to oversee and enforce the rules of collective bargaining, and ensure that rental agreements meet the standards outlined above. 

When figuring out exactly how “after-tax income” of any renter is calculated (or any other statistic outlined as a requirement for these agreements) RAHU defers to the future IRA to figure out how to calculate these numbers. One suggested model could be using predicted future income based on previous ATO declarations, or renters could nominate a value of what they think their income will be. It could also be calculated differently for each agreement, using the flexibility collectively bargained rents provide. The IRA would have to judge such models on a case by case basis.

Any punishments or fines of landlords due to violations of the negotiations lined above would be put into a fund that would be used to encourage, fund and promote cooperative and public housing.

The IRA would also set up and run an Open Renting Database.

Open Rental Database

A database is essential to allow for a far greater level of transparency in the rental market, and is an essential part of this rent control calculation. It would contain the information on a landlord, his properties that he owns, and the associated rents of such properties. Any landlord who wishes to rent a property in Australia, would have to register with such a database, listing the rental address, the current rent and costs charged to the tenant. 

It will greatly benefit and help the enforcement of not just the rent control we propose, but will help enforce and improve enforcement of a variety of other controls and laws around renting in Australia.

For example: it would greatly inhibit the widespread practice of illegal sub leases. It would end the associated legal problems caused by such sublease fights, and the denial of tenants their rights that is caused by such illegal sub leases. 

Decreased ambiguity about leases means less time spent clogging up rental courts across Australia. It also means not having to repeat the same issues over and over, as when one rental agreement is found invalid, all renters under it would then be allowed to re-negotiate.

Openness of the database will allow for a more comprehensive, and understanding picture of the rental system in Australia. At present, such data is often hidden and obfuscated – if collected at all. The database means understanding and insight into the concentration of rentals, and to allow for tenants to actually know who their landlord even is. 

Currently an information deficit exists, where one tenant must give up a large amount of information to a landlord with little to no data in return. Such a database allows for a far more balanced landlord-tenant relationship and would help prevent the current imbalance.

Considerations of privacy in specific situations should be made and adjusted accordingly, but RAHU would strongly be against allowing for over anonymisation of such data where the reason is due to them being public figures (such as politicians). 

There are still risks that this system will not completely remove false reporting from the system. The tenant verification process will still be open to abuse, especially for more vulnerable tenant groups. Accessibility options will need to be provided for these groups, including offering translations and offline options.

Enforcement and punishment will also need to be implemented for non-compliant leases, and measures should be taken to ensure the cost of such non-compliance falls on the landlord, and not the tenant. 

Every violation of tenant laws and rental agreements would also be listed in the database on the landlord’s profile.

IRA Overall and Summary

Overall, the IRA’s responsibilities would include:

  • Maintaining the national, open-access database of all rental properties, landlords, and agreed rents.
  • Providing forums for and facilitating collective bargaining processes.
  • Enforcing compliance with the minimum standards of all bargaining agreements.

This model moves away from unwieldy, one-size-fits-all government price setting. Instead, it creates a dynamic, fair, and efficient system that empowers renters, provides certainty for landlords, and ensures affordability is rooted in Australia’s economic reality. The main priority of this system is to ensure that there is a balancing of power between landlords and tenants, as to allow tenants to be empowered and make decisions about their rentals. The goal is the self organisation of the working class tenants.

Final Thoughts

The Australian rental market is not merely broken; it is actively inflicting harm. It is a system that prioritises profit over people, investment returns over human rights, and landlord power over tenant dignity. The staggering 40% increase in rents since 2021, catastrophically outpacing wages, is not an unavoidable economic phenomenon but a direct result of policy choices that have allowed housing to be treated as a speculative commodity rather than a fundamental social good.

The evidence is clear and compelling. Our rental market needs recalibration. It is essential. This is a matter of urgent social justice. Every day without action sees more people forced into impossible choices between paying rent and buying food, more families pushed into insecurity, and more individuals added to the ranks of the homeless. We have the evidence, we have a workable model, and we have a moral imperative to act. 

We also reiterate, in the long term, government-provided housing and other interventions are required to effectively and sustainably connect renters with existing and future housing stock. Rent control cannot be the only intervention to address the housing crisis.

The question is no longer if rent control can work, but whether our governments have the political courage to prioritise the well-being of their citizens over the profits of a powerful few. RAHU calls on all levels of government to heed this crisis, listen to tenants, and implement these essential measures immediately. 

“We have no choice but to pay rent. We don’t get to decide if we pay or not, and we don’t get to decide how much we pay. In the absence of rent controls, landlords have complete price-setting power.”

– Tracy Rosenthal and Leonardo Vilchis, Abolish Rent –